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I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
McClellan was denied his day in court even though he raised several legal 
defenses that could be proved by the evidence should the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
be followed. 
Appellee's brief tries to justify this miscarriage of justice through two 
fundamental misconceptions. The first misconception is that since the allegations of the 
complaint made out a prima facie case, McClellan was not entitled to his day in court. 
The proposition is so absurd as to hardly require rebuttal. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
prima facie as "a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the 
contrary." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979) (emphasis added) The basis for 
McClellan's appeal is that he was not given opportunity to disprove the prima facie case 
Plaintiff alleged. 
Mountain America's parole evidence argument may be interesting to the trial 
court .after the facts are examined to determine if the parole evidence rule can apply to 
the facts of this case. But, whether the parole evidence rule is applicable is itself a factual 
issue that was never examined in the court below and cannot now provide a ground for 
affirmance on appeal. 
The second misconception that threads its way through appellee's brief is 
that McClellan was denied his day in court because of his own delay in asserting his 
case. Of course, the original miscarriage -- entry of judgment on a motion to dismiss --
occurred in the face of a timely and adequate defense asserted by McClellan in his 
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answer. There were delays later in the case. However, the delays were caused by 
Mountain America's failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure and withdrawal of 
McClellan's lawyer during an aborted appeal McClellan was diligently pursuing. 
Ironically, the major delay in this case is Mountain America's delay in filing 
the claim against McClellan. The complaint was not filed for nearly five years after the 
maker of the note defaulted. When the claim was brought, it did not name the maker of 
the note or the major players in the business operation, but singled out the small fry who 
least understood the business transactions. The claim also failed to put McClellan on 
notice that the loan had been secured and Mountain America had let the security slip 
through its hands during the five year delay. 
Mountain America argues that McClellan's motion to set aside the ill 
considered judgment on the pleadings was properly denied because it was not brought 
until eight months after the entry of judgment. What Mountain America fails to point out 
is that the eight month delay resulted from Mountain America's default in failing to give 
McClellan notice of the judgment as required under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(d) 
and Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Mountain America also suggests that McClellan's motion to set aside 
judgment on the basis of the one action rule and his motion to amend to assert cross-
claims and third party claims are untimely because they came 22 months after the ill 
founded judgment on the pleadings. Again, Mountain America fails to point out the fact 
that McClellan had diligently pursued an appeal of the judgment on the pleadings that 
aborted and was not remanded to the District Court until a few months prior to his 
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motion. In the interim, while the case was pending on appeal, McClellan's lawyer was 
elevated to the bench leaving McClellan unrepresented. Mountain America never gave 
McClellan notice to retain new counsel or appear in person as required by Utah Rule of 
Judicial Administration 4-506. Nevertheless, in October 1991, McClellan hired new 
counsel who immediately filed the motion to set aside judgment so that McClellan could 
assert the one action rule and the motion to amend to assert a cross-claim and third party 
claims. 
There has been no lack of diligence on McClellan's part. Only a miscarriage 
of justice, followed by the failure of Mountain America to fulfill its duties under the rules. 
McClellan should not be deprived of his day in court on so flimsy a record. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. MOUNTAIN AMERICA CONCEDES THAT MATTERS 
OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY 
THE COURT IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS. THEREFORE. THE JUDGMENT MUST 
BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE 
MCCLELLAN'S ANSWER RAISED LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE 
CLAIM. 
On page 19 of Appellee's Brief, Mountain America admits There is no 
evidence in the record that the District Court considered matters outside the pleadings." 
With this fact established, the Court of Appeals should summarily reverse 
the decision of the District Court because McClellan clearly raised a defense in his answer 
that precluded entry of judgment on the pleadings. In response to the allegation in the 
complaint that "Defendants executed and delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note or 
installment loan agreement," [record 2] McClellan answered "The Defendant admits that 
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he executed the promissory note or installment loan agreement, but affirmatively asserts 
that his execution of that agreement was in his capacity as the secretary of the Callistoga 
Court Club. Inc." (emphasis added) [record 10] In addition, McClellan's answer raised 
as an affirmative defense: "Plaintiff's complaint asserts a liability for a promissory note 
which is a corporate liability not personal liability, and Defendant Robert E. McClellan is 
being sued personally." 
These assertions in the answer, if established by the evidence, constitute 
a legal defense to the Plaintiff's claim. Valley Lane Corporation v. Bowen. 592 P.2d 589, 
592 (Ut. 1979) By Mountain America's own admission, McClellan's defense to this case 
was prematurely arrested in violation of the rules governing judgment on the pleadings. 
Mountain America tries to obfuscate this obvious glaring error by arguments 
that McClellan's defense would be difficult to establish. Of course, the difficulty of the 
case he has to prove should not deny McClellan his day in court. 
1. McClellan's second signature on the Note does 
not conclusively establish personal liability on 
the Note. 
Mountain America makes the bold assertion that "the Note conclusively 
establishes that McClellan .also signed the Note in his personal capacity." Appellee's brief 
at 10. Curiously, in support of this proposition, Mountain America cites authorities that, 
at most, support a claim that the second signature makes McClellan Prima Facie liable 
on the Note. See 12 Am.Jur.2d Bills and Notes § 1172 (1964). Even if the Note itself 
establishes Plaintiff's prima facie case, McClellan cannot be denied his day in court where 
his answer raises a legal defense. Prima Facia evidence is only "a fact presumed to be 
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true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth 
Edition (1979). McClellan is entitled by virtue of his answer to a day in court to prove the 
prima facie case false. 
Mountain America's argument illustrates the wisdom in preventing judgment 
on the pleadings just because Plaintiff may have a prima facie case. Mountain America 
opines "Why would one sign the same Note twice for the same corporation? 
Furthermore, why would one sign the Note in two distinctly different ways, allegedly 
fulfilling the same function?" 
When asked in a vacuum, these questions may appear to create doubt that 
McClellan can avoid personal liability on the Note. But can there be any doubt that 
McClellan would be absolved of personal liability on the Note should Mr. Froyd, the 
bank's representative, testify that he instructed Mr. McClellan to make the second 
signature because the first signature was made out of Mr. Froyd's presence and it was 
bank procedure that the loan officer had to witness the execution of the Note, and that 
he further assured Mr. McClellan that the second signature would not create personal 
liability for Mr. McClellan? McClellan must be given his day in court to attempt to 
establish this scenario or any number of other "sets of facts that support his defense." 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd. 795 P.2d 622 (Ut. 1990). To do otherwise would allow 
Mountain America judgment upon "its own version of the facts." Strand v. Associated 
Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Ut. 1977). 
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2. The Parole Evidence Rule cannot be applied 
without a factual inquiry. 
The gravaman of Mountain America's parol evidence argument is that the 
installment loan agreement unambiguously makes McClellan personally liable and 
therefore, any attempt to explain the reason why McClellan signed a second time is 
barred by the parol evidence rule. However, that argument assumes, without any basis 
in fact, that the agreement was unambiguous and that it is an integrated contract. 
Whether or not the agreement was ambiguous as to who was liable for payment is a 
question that has never been addressed or answered by the court. Similarly, the court 
never examined whether the agreement was integrated. In its argument, Mountain 
America places itself in the position of the court and affirmatively states that there is no 
ambiguity. By so assuming, Mountain America asserts that the court could not go 
beyond the "unambiguous" four corners of the note and take extrinsic evidence from 
McClellan and Hoyt that established that the bank officer represented that their second 
signature on the note did not indicate a personal obligation for payment, but was only 
necessary to allow the bank to process the loan application. 
Examination of the agreement shows that there is ambiguity as to whether 
McClellan signed to evince an intent to be personally liable. The upper left hand corner 
of the agreement states that the maker was Callistoga Court Club, Inc. It does not 
include the name of Robert E. McClellan anywhere in the box that is designed for the 
maker. Furthermore, there is nothing in the text of the agreement that indicates that 
McClellan was a maker. The only place where "maker" is defined is in the upper left hand 
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box. The text of the agreement unambiguously states that it is the "maker" that is 
responsible for the payment under the agreement. As the cases Mountain America cites 
confirm, where there is an ambiguity as to whether the signatories intended to be 
personally liable on the note, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, where there is a question whether the 
contract that is the subject of dispute is an integrated contract, the trial court must make 
a finding of fact that the contract is integrated. See Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 638 
P.2d 1190,1194 (Utah 1981): Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 
(1972). Without that finding, the court cannot exclude parol evidence. £ie_, 638 P.2d at 
1194. No such finding was made in this case. 
The case at bar is remarkably similar to a number of cases from this 
jurisdiction and others that find no personal liability in circumstances where the individual 
is induced into signing the contract with promises of no personal liability. For example, 
in Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court was 
confronted with a case in which the Union Bank sought to recover on a defaulted 
corporate obligation for which Swenson was allegedly liable. Swenson's alleged personal 
liability was based on his alleged promise to pay as evidenced by a promissory note. The 
trial court granted judgment on the note and precluded all extrinsic evidence as to why 
Swenson had signed individually. On appeal, Swenson argued that the parol evidence 
was admissible to show that he had been induced by a promise from the bank officers 
that his individual signature on the note would not impose liability and that he would not 
have signed in the absence of such a promise. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with 
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Swenson's position and reversed the trial court's order of judgment against Swenson. 
The Swenson case is on all fours with the issues in this case and should be followed in 
rejecting Mountain America's parol evidence argument. See also Berkeley Bank 
Coopertives v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980) (affirming jury verdict that note 
signatories were not personally liable where signatures were induced by promise that they 
were not individually liable). 
There is nothing in negotiable instruments law that modifies this general rule. 
Mountain America's brief only succeeds in giving that impression through a butchered 
quotation of the Utah Statute. 
Mountain America quotes Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-403 as follows: 
"An authorized representative who signs his own name to an 
instrument... is personally obligated if the instrument names 
the person represented but does not show that the 
representative signed in a representative capacity 
The portion Mountain America conveniently left out of states: "except as 
otherwise established between the immediate parties".1 
It is this exception that McClellan pleaded but was improperly denied the 
opportunity to prove. McClellan's evidence will show that the Bank's officer required the 
additional signature to satisfy a procedural rule of the bank, but assured the signers that 
it would create no personal liability. Between the immediate parties, McClellan will show 
that he was not assuming personal liability by the second signature. 
The full quote reads as follows: "An authorized representative who signs his own name to an 
instrument, except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the 
instrument names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a 
representative capacity . . . . " (emphasis added) 
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B. THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ILL ADVISED JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED EVEN 
THOUGH 8 MONTHS PASSED FROM ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
TO THE FILING OF THE MOTION. 
It is a long established policy of the law in this state to favor a trial on the 
merits and to afford both sides a full opportunity to present their evidence and 
contentions as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of on substantial rather than 
technical grounds. McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates. Inc. 411 P.2d 129, 130 
(Utah 1966). To this end, courts should exercise caution in regard to default judgments 
and should be somewhat indulgent in setting them aside. Jd. 
It is true that 8 months passed from entry of the judgment on the pleadings 
to the filing of the motion to set it aside. However, the reason for the delay was Mountain 
America's default in failing to give notice of Judgment as required under Rule 58A & Rule 
4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. [Record 43, 56, 62, 83] 
In Workman v. Naale Construction. Inc. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court reversed the trial court's failure to set aside a default judgment because the motion 
was not filed for more than a year after entry of judgment. On the question of timeliness, 
the court centered on the fact that Plaintiff had failed to give Defendant notice of the entry 
of judgment as required by various Utah Court rules: 
In this case [defendant] moved to set aside the judgment 
within about a month after learning that the judgment had 
been entered, and her ignorance of the judgment until that 
time was due in part to a lack of notice that the plaintiff was 
required to provide. [Under rules 58A(d) and rule 4-504] Jd. 
at 752. 
Similarly, in this case McClellan was given no notice of the entry of judgment 
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as required by the rules. When he learned of the judgment, he immediately moved to set 
aside the judgment [Record 60]. Mountain America cannot be allowed to rob McClellan 
of his day in court where the delay in bringing the motion arises from its own default. 
C. EVEN IF MCCLELLAN'S ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE ONE 
ACTION RULE DEFENSE WAS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED ASSERTION OF THE 
DEFENSE. 
The record is undisputed that Zion's did not foreclose a trust deed that had 
priority over Mountain America's trust deed. Mountain America's own exhibit, Addendum 
Exhibit "D", shows that the Zion's trust deed was recorded on February 19,1988 over four 
years .after the Mountain America trust deed. McClellan is entitled to his day in court to 
show that Mountain America's loss resulted from its own failure in its duty to maintain the 
collateral. 
Mountain America never grapples with the fact that the face of its own 
exhibit supports McClellan's position and requires a trial. It attempts to avoid this 
unpleasant reality by asserting that Zions Bank's note was prior in time because it was 
recorded earlier, albeit, incorrectly. The gravaman of the argument is that the error in the 
description of the property was not "material." In support of that position, Mountain 
America cites to Washington v. Slack. 813 P.2d 447 (Mont. 1991). Unfortunately for 
Mountain America, Slack does not support its position. 
First, the appellate court in Slack was reviewing a trial court determination 
that found that the error in the recording was not material. In this case, there has never 
been such a determination. Like all other areas of this dispute there has never been a 
determination by the court on any substantive issue. Second, the error in Slack did not 
10 
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 PR 6 1993 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Re: Mountain America Credit Union v. Robert E. McClellan 
No. 920217-CA 
Dear Ms* Noonan: 
The purpose of this letter is to inform the Court of a 
recent 9th Circuit case that has come out since filing the briefs 
in the above-referenced matter that is currently under 
consideration before the Honorable Judges Billings, Garff, and 
Greenwood. Please find enclosed copies of this letter, for your 
convenience, that might be distributed to these judges. 
The case of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. 
Woodside Construction, Inc.. 979 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1992), is 
highly relevant to this case. While not authoritatively binding 
upon the court, Mountain America Credit Union ("MACU") believes 
Woodside's persuasive value is of the highest order. 
In Woodside. the president of a corporation obtained a loan 
for $912,000 from Alaska Mutual Bank. The note bore the 
president's signature below the name of the corporation, on the 
line designating his representative capacity as president. It 
also bore Gait's signature above the name of the corporation with 
no representative capacity designated. Id. at 174. The Alaska 
Bank merged with two other banks and became the Alliance Bank, 
which retained the Woodside obligation. Eventually Alliance Bank 
was closed and the FDIC came to own the Woodside obligation. Id. 
Following U.C.C. Section 3-403, the Woodside court held that 
a corporate president who signed a promissory note above the 
corporate name without any designation of representative capacity 
bound himself as endorser in his individual capacity. Id. at 
175. This identical provision of the U.C.C. has been adopted in 
Utah at Section 70A-3-403, Utah Code Ann. (1992), and MACU cited 
to this provision in support of its argument in its brief. See 
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Furthermore, the Woodside court held that in this particular 
situation, evidence attempting to show that the signer acted in a 
representative capacity was inadmissible parol evidence "between 
a holder of the note other than the original lender and the 
signer . . • because [the signer] cannot supply the missing 
ingredient." Woodside, 979 F.2d at 175; see also FDIC v. 
Tennessee Wildcat Services, Inc., 839 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 
1988)(issuing similar ruling). 
The facts in this case are identical to that in Woodside. 
Horizon Thrift ("Horizon") is MACU's predecessor in interest on 
the McClellan note. While parol evidence may have been 
admissible in a case between McClellan and Horizon, it is not 
admissible in a case between McClellan and MACU. Indeed, the 
facts of this case make Woodside even more persuasive. In 
Woodside, on each signature there was at least some reference to 
either the corporation represented or the representative 
capacity, but not both. Woodside, 979 F.2d at 175. In the case 
currently under consideration, McClellan signed the note a second 
time without reference to the corporation represented or his 
representative capacity. Following Woodside, as well as those 
authorities previously cited in MACU's brief, this Court should 
hold McClellan personally liable on the note. 
Thank you for your assistance. We look forward to the 
Court's rendering of an opinion in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
READING 
J. Bruce Reading 
Attorney for MACU 
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Blake S. Atkin 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
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involve the description of the property that was the subject of the lien, rather it involved 
an error in the names of the parties. Significantly, the Slack court found that the 
description on the property was correct. In that regard, Slack supports McClellan's 
position. Indeed, an examination of the Slack case shows that where there has been a 
property description error in the recording the first properly recorded lien has priority. Jd. 
at 449-50 (citing Ponceletv. English. 795 P.2d 436 (Mont. 1990): Ely v. Hoida. 226 P. 525 
(Mont. 1924)). 
Finally, Mountain America's reliance on Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan 
Lodge No. 1453.88 Utah 577,56 P.2d 1046 (1936), rather that the court's recent decision 
in Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty. Inc.. 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983), for the correct 
application of a lienholder's obligation to insure that a senior lien holder has exhausted 
the collateral is misplaced. The language in Lockhart could not be more clear. 
Mountain America claims McClellan should lose his day in court because 
the one action rule issue was brought to the court's attention in a rule 54(b) motion to set 
aside the interlocutory judgment rather than a rule 15 motion to amend the answer and 
assert an affirmative defense. Appellee's brief at 26. Curiously, in the next breath, 
Mountain America argues that the motion to amend to assert cross-claims and a third 
party complaint was properly denied because McClellan did not first move to have the 
judgment set aside. Appellee's brief at 38. 
The fact that even Mountain America can't make up its mind which should 
come first - the motion to set aside the judgment or the motion to amend -- is evidence 
of the wisdom in our rules of civil procedure which require focus on substantial justice 
11 
rather than procedural niceties. See Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As shown in McClellan's opening brief, a motion under rule 54(b) to amend 
judgment prior to entry of a final judgment is an appropriate vehicle to use in bringing new 
matters to the court's attention that affect its judgment. See authorities cited in 
Appellant's brief at 17 n.6. If the court felt that a motion to amend would be a more 
appropriate vehicle, then in the interests of justice, the motion should have been 
considered a motion to amend. 
D. MOUNTAIN AMERICA'S ONE ACTION RULE "SANCTION" 
ARGUMENT IS INAPPOSITE. 
Mountain America cites a number of cases for the proposition that if the one 
action rule is not asserted in the first case brought by the creditor, in a later action the 
rule can only be used to show a waiver of the creditor's rights in the collateral. 
Even if Mountain America's characterization of these cases were correct, 
they are completely inapposite. McClellan's motion was not brought in the second action 
by the creditor. Instead, by his motion, McClellan sought to show the court that an 
interlocutory order it had entered was ill-considered, and he should have been allowed 
to assert the defense in the original action brought by the creditor. As shown above, the 
substantial delays in this matter were on the part of Mountain America and McClellan has 
been diligent in pursuing this case. McClellan had no idea until two weeks before the 
motion was filed that Mountain America had failed in its duty to protect the collateral. At 
the time the motion was filed, there was no trial date, no discovery cut-off date and no 
delay or prejudice would have occurred. Therefore, the motion should have been granted 
and McClellan should have been given an opportunity to plead and prove the one action 
12 
rule defense. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's decision granting judgment 
on the pleadings should be reversed and its denial of McClellan's motion to amend to 
bring cross-claims and third party claims should be reversed and this case remanded for 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this > day of August, 1992. 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for Appellant 
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